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Abstract 
The literature aimed at exploring labor regulation and cross-country comparisons has left partly 
unexplored two major points: the first is the influence of employees within managerial processes, 
through the channel of employee representation at firm level. The second point concerns potential 
complementarities or substitutions between patterns of ownership or shareholder protection and 
labour regulation. The paper offers a critical overview of some selected studies that have started at 
filling these gaps by considering labour institutions for their influence on the ‘balance’ of power 
inside the firm, between owners, management, and employees.  
Firstly, it examines the literature which gives a central importance to the effects of legal origins on 
labour regulation and labour market outcomes. Secondly, it reviews the studies which focus on 
informal rules and de-facto practices and favour a stakeholder approach. A particular concern is paid 
to the overall consequences of the different institutional setups in the perspective of the “varieties of 
capitalism”, in which systems of labour regulation exert their function by strategical interactions with 
other institutions.  
Finally, it presents recent theoretical and empirical studies centring on employee investments in 
firm-specific human capital and on institutional devices which have the effect of tying the fortunes 
of the employee together with those of the firm. 
In the varieties of capitalism characterised by general skills and patterns of radical innovation, it is 
emphasized the internal governance exerted by ‘critical employees’. In economies with firm and 
industry specific skills, cooperation of employees with management in more shareholder value 
oriented firm (‘negotiated shareholder system’) are the more successful roads. 
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“The institutions of labor law and employment relations”- as Ahlering and Deakin write -“intersect 
with the mechanisms of corporate governance at two levels. One, the level of the firm, is concerned 
with the constitution and governance of the enterprise and with the influence of employees within 
managerial processes. The other, the level of the market, is concerned with how far basic 
employment conditions are regulated across the labor market as a whole or, alternatively, left up to 
individual or collective agreement in particular sectors or enterprises (Ahlering and Deakin, 2007, p. 
874). Until now, the economics of labor protection, recently reviewed by Addison and Teixeira 
(2001), has paid limited attention to these critical linkages, which involve the enterprise governance 
and firm production regime. This literature has left unexplored two major points: the first is the 
influence of employees within managerial processes, through the channel of employee representation 
at firm level. Indeed, labor protection devices, offered by labor market institutions, are supplemented 
by a “second channel”, consisting of institutions for worker representation (Roger and Streeck, 
1994): In this field, we may observe that provisions for the “rights and obligations” of employees in 
corporate governance decisions - which may be important in cross-country comparisons, belong to 
an area which is still relatively unexplored in most comparative studies on labor institutions. The 
second point concerns the limited attention paid to potential complementarities or substitutions 
between patterns of ownership or shareholder protection and labor regulation.  
The following sections offer a critical overview of some selected studies which have started filling 
these gaps by considering labor institutions from the viewpoint of their influence on the ‘balance’ of 
power inside the firm, between owners, management and employees. The limitations and potentials 
of these studies, which still do not represent a coherent area of academic research, will be discussed. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the literature which gives central importance 
to the effects of the legal origins of labor regulation and labor market outcomes. Section 3 reviews 
studies which focus on informal rules and de facto practices and favor a stakeholder approach. 
Section 4 reviews a more fragmentary vision originating from literature on the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ approach, in which systems of labor regulation exert their function by strategical 
interactions with other institutions. Section 5 presents recent theoretical and empirical studies. 
 
                                                 
1A first version of this paper was presented at the Eighth International Conference in 
Commemoration of Marco Biagi, Rethinking Corporate Governance: From Shareholder Value To 
Stakeholder Value”, at the Auditorium, Marco Biagi Foundation, Modena, Thursday 18 – Saturday 
20 March 2010,  The author thanks the discussants and participants to the conference for their useful 
comments. Special thanks to Valentina Tiecco and Marco Bellucci for their competent and useful 
assistance.    3
2.  Shareholder protection and labor regulation: the legal origin hypothesis  
 
Recent studies have been carried out by Botero et al. (2004), who examine the issue of labor 
regulation, comprehensive of both dimensions (worker representation and labor market regulation) 
and test the hypothesis that ‘law matters’. Their study represents a further step in the growing ‘law 
and finance’ literature, inaugurated by La Porta et al. (1997). In this area, many contributions by La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny - ‘LLSV’- show that protection and enforcement of 
shareholders’ rights are the main pre-conditions for the formation of corporate value (La Porta et al. 
1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, Djankov et al., 2008). LLSV have also shown that limited protection of 
shareholders’ interests mainly involves countries with civil law codes and causes concentration of 
ownership and illiquid capital markets. Indeed, as the authors write: “Initial research in this area 
argues theoretically and shows empirically that differences in legal investor protection across 
countries shape the ability of insiders to expropriate outsiders, and thus determine investor 
confidence in markets and consequently market development” (Djankov et. 2008, p.431). In the 
same vein, the enriched law and labor literature emphasizes the fact that soft or strict work 
regulations, which arise from the original legal family of each country, influence the proper 
functioning (in case of common law countries) or the worse functioning (in case of civil law 
economies) of labor markets as well as financial institutions.  
This thesis is advocated by Botero et al. (2004), who collected data, as of 1997, for a large sample of 
85 countries, on the legal framework in three distinct ‘areas’ of labor regulation: employment laws; 
collective relations laws, and various measures which capture social security provisions
2. It should be 
noted that their comprehensive database contemplates, as mentioned above, not only employment-
unemployment provisions and payoff rights, but also workers’ decision rights, which may have some 
influence on the balance of power inside the firm, and which are not included in other databases, like 
those sponsored by the OECD (Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud, 1999) and the World Bank (Forteza 
and Rama, 2000), For instance, Botero et al. (2004) account for the presence of employees in work 
councils or on boards of directors in order to obtain some evaluation of arrangements that give a 
‘voice’ to employees and represent additional channels influencing the governance of the enterprise.
3  
                                                 
2The employment laws index is the average of four different measures: 1) alternative employment 
contracts; 2) cost of increasing hours worked; 3) cost of firing workers; 4) dismissal procedures. The 
collective relations laws index is an average based on two indicators: 1) labor union power; 2) 
collective disputes. The Social Security laws index considers three different measures: 1) old age, 
disability and death benefits; 2) sickness and health benefits; 3) unemployment benefits.  
3 The index of Botero et al. (2004) includes rights to unionize and to collective bargaining, but these 
are not the same features computed by the OECD indicator (i.e., trade union density, coverage by 
collective agreements, centralization and co-ordination of wage bargaining). Conversely, the above   4
The authors test the hypothesis that, in imperfect labor markets, where the employment relationship 
is a source of rents, employers may try to extract these rents and labor regulation ensures forms of 
protection of workers from employers (efficient hypothesis). Under this hypothesis, there should not 
be large negative effects, even if, as the authors admit, “it is possible that the benefits of regulation to 
protected workers are higher than these distortions, making the overall welfare assessment 
indeterminate”(Botero et al. 2004, p.1343). But they also find, from econometric estimates, “no 
benefits, and some costs”. In particular, their estimates show that “more protective employment, 
collective relations, and social security laws lead to lower male (but not female) participation in the 
labor force, and that more protective employment laws lead to higher unemployment, especially of 
the young” (Botero et al. 2004, p. 1375 and p. 1378).  
In addition, these negative effects are mainly explained by the legal origin of each country, more than 
by political power theories. These theories see regulations as outcomes of the political power of 
labor, and their proponents suggest that these provisions are mainly adopted by leftist governments to 
benefit their supporters (Roe, 2000, Pagano and Volpin, 2005
4).  
Botero et al. also find, from a database which contemplates 60 norms and 85 countries, as mentioned 
above, high and significant correlations between labor regulation indices and sub-indices, which tend 
to disprove substitution effects between different forms of regulation. These correlations, as well as 
econometric estimates, are consistent with their main claim: patterns of labor regulation follow the 
general style  used by each legal system more generally.  
The heavier labor regulation of civil law countries causes two main negative consequences: higher 
unemployment, and lower labor force participation. By estimating the effects of the three sets of 
worker protection indicators, the authors detect the significant negative effects of these indicators on 
male participation in the labor force, the highest detrimental effect being due to collective relations 
measures.  
These findings are connected with the claim that more restricted protection of shareholders’ interests, 
which characterizes countries with civil law codes, causes illiquid and under-developed capital 
markets. In fact, in a typical civil law country, such as Germany, the stock market capitalization is 
only fifty per cent of GDP, whereas it is three times the value of GDP in two common law 
economies, the US and the UK.  
Table 1 lists the main results for finance and labor regulation - collected by Djankov et al. (2006, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
authors' index for union power takes into account information and decision rights of employees 
which are not included in the OECD indicator.  
4Pagano and Volpin (2005) focus on the importance of proportional versus majoritarian electoral 
systems, and show that “proportional voting pushes political parties to cater more to the preferences 
of social groups with homogenous preferences, that is, entrepreneurs and employees”(p. 1007).    5
2008) and Botero et al. (2004). More specifically, the values for the various measures are grouped by 
legal families and include two new measures for investor protection. The first is the revised measure 
of the original index of shareholder rights, originally computed by La Porta et al. (1998) and later 
revised after criticisms on coding and ambiguities by some authors (including  Spamann, 2005)
5, but 
which still persist, even after revisions, since the data are sensitive to the way the indexes are 
constructed and the different components aggregated (Spamann, 2008). 
The second value is a new index which takes into account the role of law in addressing various 
corporate self-dealings undertaken by managers and controlling shareholders (excessive 
compensation, transfer pricing, self-serving financial transaction, and similarities).  
                                                 
5Note that, in a further study, Spamann (2008, p.4) argues, referring to the revised indicators of 
Djankov et al. (2008), that: “none of these indices can revive the results linking poor investor 
protection to ownership concentration (LLSV 1998, LLS 1999)... “ In the same study, Spamann also 
proposes new indexes which should be preferred to those revised by Djankov et al. (2008) and 
created in response to his own earlier manuscript. “The most striking difference is that the Djankov et 
al index  is on average significantly higher in common than civil law countries.”   6
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Anti-director 
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0.66 0.38  0.33  0.39  6.29*** 
 Labor  regulation  Indexes 
Employment 
Protection (b) 
0.2997 0.4529  0.5470  0,6838   
Collective 
Relations (b)  
0.3313 0,4787  0.4914  0.4814   
Social 
Security (b) 
0,4236 0.7110  0.5454  0.8324   





85.5% 48.9%  42.0%  90.4%  2.33** 
Log GNP per 
capita 1997 
(d) ($) 




44% 34%  55%  37%  7.39***- 
(a) The revised index of Djankov et al. (2006), Tab. XIII; (aa) Djankov et al. (2008), Tab. 3; (b)Labor 
regulation indexes, Botero et al. (2004), Table III ; ( c) Djankov et al. (2006), Table VI; (d) Botero et 
al. (2004), Table III, p. 1364; (e) Djankov et al. (2006), Table VI: average percentage of common 
shares owned by top 3 largest shareholders in 10 largest non-financial, privately-owned domestic 
firms. (*) significant at 10% level; (**) significant at 5% level; (***) significant at 1% level. 
 
The descriptive statistics listed in Table 1 (obtained from a database of ample coverage) should prove 
that law matters: legal systems are the main determinants of both the weak investor protection and 
greater labor regulation of Continental Europe (German and French Civil law countries). In these 
economies, the stock market is bound to be underdeveloped, although we observe that no detrimental   7
effects on GDP per capita growth are obtained
6. However, the latter result only proves that law - and 
not wealth - matters, as the authors write: “There is no evidence that employment laws or collective 
relations laws vary with the level of economic development. This result is inconsistent with the 
implication of the efficiency hypothesis that rich countries should regulate less because they have 
fewer market failures”(Botero et al. 2004, p. 1364).  
The employment laws index and the anti-self dealing index by countries are shown in Figure 1. 















































































Source: Botero et al. (2004) and Djankov et al. (2006) 
 
                                                 
6Djankov et al. (2008) consider five indicators of stock market development: i) the average ratio of 
stock market capitalization to GDP; ii) the (median) premium paid for control in corporate control 
transactions; iii) the average number of domestic publicly traded firms; IV) the average value of 
initial public offerings; a proxy for ownership concentration.    8
LLSV maintain that the general style of regulation in different domains typifies each country and the 
distinct legal families to which they belong. But is this style homogenous, or are there significant 
differences, for instance in ranking countries by employment laws and collective bargaining indexes, 
or in rules and  their enforcement? Some additional information in both directions gives a more 
variegated picture.  
For a sub-sample of countries considered by Botero et al. (2004), i.e., European economies, Japan 
and the US, a rough overview of differences in employment and collective relations rule is offered by 
Figure 2, in which average values of employment laws and collective relations are shown by dashed 
lines. 



























































Source: Botero et al. (2004) 
 
A shown in Figure 2, European countries are characterized by different intensities of labor regulation 
in distinct areas, such as employment contracts and collective relations. Germany, for instance, shows 
strict regulation of collective relations rules (higher than the average value obtained for the full 
sample of 85 countries), but a softer degree of rigidity (lower than the average) for employment 
contracts. The opposite is true for Finland.  
A second point is the relationship between finance and labor regulation and their enforcement. The 
importance of enforcement of investor protection has been stressed in the Italian case, for take-over 
regulatory measures (Barker and Rueda, 2007) and minority shareholder protection (Spaventa, 2004). 
As noted by Spaventa (2004), “The Italian case provides further anecdotal evidence: though after a 
reform enacted in 1998 Italy’s score in the anti-director index jumped from 1 to 5, out of maximum   9
of 6, nothing much changed in the following years in terms of ownership structure or the number of 
listed companies” (p.13).  
In addition, note that the (private) anti-self dealing index is compounded by two groups of indicators: 
indexes of disclosures required before transactions are approved, and indexes which measure the ease 
in rescinding transactions
7. In Italy, ex-ante control measures are less binding, but requirements to 
sue managers and controlling shareholders are less demanding, as groups of shareholders owning 
only 5% of equities can sue the board. However, the efficacy of ex-post self-dealing control is 
conditioned by the real interests and incentives of minority shareholders and by public enforcement, 
the additional measure that Djankov et al. compute to evaluate rule of law.  
To sum up, indexes of disclosures required before and after transactions determine, respectively, ex- 
ante and ex-post private control of self dealing. These two groups of indicators, which compound the 
(private) anti-self dealing index, must be considered along a public enforcement index, which 
measures the real effectiveness of all the provisions
8. For the sample of 72 countries covered by both 
studies, Botero et al.(2004) and Djankov et al. (2006, 2008), a description of correlations between 
















                                                 
7 Indeed, the regulation of self-dealing may be accomplished by approval requirements and disclosure 
before the transaction (‘private ex-ante control of self-dealing’) and by disclosure and period filings 
after  the transaction, which measure the ease with which minority shareholders can prove 
wrongdoing (‘private ex-post control of self-dealing’). 
8For a methodological explanation of these new indicators, see Djankov et al. (2008) Tab. I.   10
Table 2: Correlations of labor regulations protection and corporate governance indexes 







































-0.0652 -0.0119 -0.0497  0.2464* 
Source: our elaborations on Djankov et al. (2008) and Botero et al. (2004; the correlations are 
computed for a sample of 69 countries; * significant at5% level. 
 
Table 2 shows that stronger labor protection is associated with different degrees of correlation with 
ex-ante and ex-post  self-dealing rules and, first of all, that the consideration of the additional 
dimension, i.e., public enforcement, reveals that labor regulation does not necessarily lead to worse 
enforcement of investor protection rules. 
These findings open the road to other critical points. The first, as shown below, is that not only 
formal norms but also informal rules and labor practices are important.  
 
3. Informal norms and labor practices 
Botero et al. (2004) claim that their measures should reflect, in their words, “actual economic costs 
and not just statutory language” (p. 1347). But the problem still remains. For instance, let us consider 
norms for collective bargaining. As stressed by Ahlering and Deakin (2007, pp. 884-885), “the 
mandatory requirement that companies bargain with unions or work councils shapes a great deal 
about the labor environment in Germany, while the lack of this particular written law may be less 
significant in shaping the labor environment in Japan, where a different style of consensual company 
politics prevails, making it less necessary for the formal law to intervene”. But the evaluation of labor 
protection outcomes calls for regulation ‘in practice’, rather than ‘law on the book’.   11
A different database, which collects de facto practices, is the 2004 Global Labor  Survey (GLS), 
performed for 33 countries and aimed at surveying practitioners and experts who have direct 
knowledge of both regulations and their actual implementation (Chor and Freeman, 2005, p. 4). The 
GLS survey is an Internet-based survey aimed at gathering information from labor experts and 
practitioners of 33 countries and addressed to evaluation of labor regulations. Chor and Freeman 
explicitly compare the GLS measures with data on the legal provisions from Botero et al. (2004). 
What they find is an insignificant correlation between formal and informal regulation. For instance, 
by considering de facto measures which strictly parallel the de jure provisions of Botero et la. (2004), 
Chor and Freeman obtain the results shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Correlations among formal and informal measures of Regulation of labor 







































-0.0652 -0.0119 -0.0497  0.2464* 
Source: Figures are correlation coefficients, *,**, *** denote p-values significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. See Chor and Freeman (2005, Table 8, p. 42);  
 
Indeed, when de  jure regulations of labor, like those discussed by Botero et al. (2004) and reviewed 
in the above section, are complemented with the new GLS indices of de facto labor practices, some 
additional insights can be reached. On employment regulations, for instance, a comparison in the 
ranking of countries according to the strictness of de jure and  de facto norms (see Figure 3) 
highlights the significant change in the Japanese position, which confirms the indications of Ahlering 






Figure 3: Employment regulations in a sample of developed economies 
De jure rules        De facto rules 
   
Sources: Botero et al. (2004) and Chor and Freeman (2005) 
 
Another important indicator for the balance of power inside the firm is the frequency of labor unrest 
and conflicts. According to this index, the frequency of labor disputes has the lowest score in a 
shareholder country, such as the US. By contrast, in countries where unions and labor organizations 
are more powerful, such as France, Belgium and Italy, the indicator for employer-employee conflicts 
reaches the highest levels. But an interesting and unexpected result arises: the frequency of labor 
strikes and the nature of labor conflicts qualify the German case as one of the less ‘confrontational’ 











Figure 4: Labor disputes in some industrialized countries, 2000 
 
Source: Chor and Freeman (2005, Tab. 5, p. 37). Indicator scores from 1 to 7 and was obtained from 
responses to 12 questions related to threats, frequency and features of strikes. See Chor and Freeman 
(2005, Module 4, pp. 49-50). 
 
In any case, what all the data tell us is that the US is last in terms of  formal and inormal labor rules. 
Freeman (2007) suggests that the American flexible labor practices are among the main causes of the 
great dispersion of earnings and income inequality recorded in this economy, whereas the beneficial 
effects in terms of other aggregate outcomes, such as employment and unemployment rates, remain 
equivocal
9. The author, a convinced supporter of the stakeholder economy, strongly supports the 
need for a political perspective that calls attention to historical trends: he  writes: “the second 
possible interpretation of empirical results is that the effects of institutions on outcomes changes over 
time due to changes in the economic environment or to changes in institutional responses to particular 
economic stimuli” (Freeman, 2007, p. 24).These dynamic considerations will be discussed in a 
following section. But first we analyze a central question posed by comparative studies on labor and 





                                                 
9The author shows, according to OECD data, that around the year 2000 the US had the highest 
dispersion of wages (measured by the ratio of the pay of persons in the 90
th percentile of wages and 
salaries relative to wages and salaries of persons in the 10
th percentile). The US had also the highest 
level of overall income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient). Freeman documents the 
ambiguous effects of labor institutions on unemployment and employment by considering various 
studies. See among others,  Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005).   14
4. Institutional complementarities and “varieties of capitalism” approach 
 
A prominent view to evaluating institutional complementarities and their interactions with labor 
regulation is offered by the “varieties of capitalism” approach. This does not contrast but in some 
way extends the ‘efficient’ hypothesis advanced by North (1981), according to which the adoption of 
specific institutions may be seen as a proper and convenient choice capable of improving welfare and 
curing endemic failures. 
For instance, the German and Japanese economies represent models of a ‘patient capitalism’ assured 
via long-term labor contracts, and thus longer-term jobs and higher employment tenures; in addition, 
wage agreements at sectoral level can contribute to lowering intra-firm conflicts related to selection 
and retaining policies for skilled employees.  
In addition, in a coordinated market economy such as Germany, employee involvement may fit well 
with concentrated share-ownership: employee representatives participate in decision-making with 
block-holders and cooperate with them in monitoring managers. At the same time, moderate wage 
differentials across firms and industries reduce the propensity of employees to change jobs, and are 
consistent with cross-shareholdings and investments of employees in firm and industry- specific 
skills.  
Also, in this type of system, where enduring relations are pervasive, take-overs and hostility are quite 
rare - a common fact usually explained by the specificities of its governance system, in which insider 
protection is higher and corporate relations, as mentioned above, foster long-term cooperation and 
encourage firm-specific investments by lenders, employees and large shareholders (Schmidt, 2003, 
Damiani, 2009).  
Confirmation of the lower propensity of coordinated systems to utilise the market for the corporate 
control has recently been found by Damiani and Pompei (2008): recent figures on the incidence of 
take-overs in Europe show that a liberal market economy, such as that prevailing in the UK, is the 
most active player in the market for corporate control, with a proportion of more than 17% of firms 








Figure 5: The market for corporate control in Europe: proportion of listed firms targeted in 
M&A deals, 1995-2005 
 
Source: Damiani and Pompei (2008). 
 
A different variety of capitalism is represented by the Anglo-Saxon system. In this context, 
characterized by dispersed ownership, individual investors have little incentive for active governance. 
Such features are parallel to market relations and arm’s-length exchanges of labor services: the 
distinctive features of labor relationships are wage patterns linked to labor market conditions, 
decentralized company-level bargaining, and, lastly, no restrictions on labor adjustment.  
However, in these economies, in which the single agent does not have sufficient power or incentive 
to detect and contrast inefficient management, alternative forces may play a disciplinary role. 
Managerial incentives, as well as take-over threats, as seen above, may mitigate the moral hazard 
problems affecting corporations (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Recent data on CEO compensations 











Figure 6: CEO compensations in Europe and US-2008 (€) 
 
Source: Conyon et al. (2010); the sample excludes firms with less than €100m in 2008 revenues 
 
The potential drawback (in opposition to North’s efficient hypothesis) is represented by the 
malfunctioning of the Anglo-Saxon incentive system, which leaves too much space to entrenchment 
and managerial misconduct (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) and income inequalities (Freeman, 2007)
10.  
A distinctive feature of coordinated and liberal market economies concerns the varieties of 
production regimes and their different skill profiles. Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) show that diverse 
types of worker protection prevailing in various types of capitalism are associated with different 
types of skills: i) firm-specific skills, acquired through on-the-job training, are valuable to the 
employer who carried out the training but not to other employers; ii) industry-specific skills, acquired 
through apprenticeship and vocational schools, nay be valuable to other employers in specific sectors, 
especially when certified, iii) general skills, more transferable, have a value independent of the type 
of firm or industry. The authors show that, on one hand, Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) 
provide institutional support for forms of industry-specific training (adopted in environments of 
collaborative research and development between firms) or promote support for the acquisition of 
firm-specific competences. 
The high unemployment protection of Denmark is a good case in point for the first kind of skill 
equilibrium. As Estevez-Abe et al. (2001, p ) argue: “A high replacement ratio also eliminates the 
downward pressure on specific skilled wages, as unemployed skilled workers do not have to take job 
offers at discounted wages”. In addition, “A longer benefit duration permits the unemployed 
                                                 
10See Bebchuk and Fried (2003), to examine the view of “Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem”.   17
industry-specific skill holders enough time to find another job that matches their skills, especially if 
they are permitted to turn down jobs that are outside their core competences”. 
A different case is that of the high employment protection (accompanied by a low degree of 
unemployment protection) which characterizes Japan, a typical example of firm-specific skill 
equilibrium. In Japanese companies, loyalties in labor relations and high length of job tenure are 
forms of insurance for workers to acquire those company-specific skills which the enterprise needs.  
Conversely, Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) provide economic agents with greater opportunities 
to acquire general skills, adoptable to multi-purpose technologies. In LMEs, such as the US, 
individuals without employment and unemployment protection are encouraged to develop general, 
rather than specific, skills, as the corporate strategies in LMEs tend to require.  
Table 4 lists some country data for employment and unemployment protection indexes and 
skill profiles. The first indicator, developed by Estevez-Abe et al. (2001), is a composite 
measure obtained as the average of three different indicators: the OECD relative stringency 
of legislation on individual hiring and firing rules; the OECD restrictiveness of collective 
dismissal rules; and company-based protection computed by the authors by taking into 
account firm-level protection (such as the presence of employees in company bodies with 
manpower decisions). Unemployment protection is the unemployment replacement rate, the 
share of a worker’s previous wage which is replaced by unemployment benefits. Table 4 gives some 
support to the thesis that “employment protection increases the propensity of workers to invest in 
firm-specific skills, whereas unemployment protection facilitates investment in industry-specific 
skills. The absence of both gives people strong incentives to invest in general skills”. (Estevez-Abe 











Table 4: Labor protection, tenure and training profiles   18
  A:  Index of Employment protection (EP)   





UP=.0.91  EP= 0.53 
Industry- and firm- 
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Denmark 4.4.  31  Mixed 
Germany 10.7  34  Dual  apprenticeship 
USA 4.2  3  Weak 
Japan 8.3  16  Company  based 
Source: Index of employment protection is obtained (see Estevez-Abe, 2001), Tables 4.1 and 4.2, 
Figure 4.1. (b) Share of age cohort in either secondary or post-secondary vocational training. 
Source: UNESCO (1999). (c) Character of vocational training system according to whether most 
training occurs at company level (as in Japan), through a dual apprenticeship system (as in Germany), 
or through some mixture of the latter two. 
 
For the German case, one can note that the combination of industry- and firm-specific skills renders 
the country's companies vulnerable to two different problems: the hold-up between employers and 
their workers for firm-specific skills, and ‘poaching’ of trained workers from other enterprises for 
industry-specific skills. The employee channel of representation at company level and industry-level 
bargaining are addressed toward solving  these problems and ensure that employees invest in 
company- and industry-specific skills. Conversely, the US, is “an archetypical case of a country with 
a weak company and vocational training system, but a very advanced higher education system. 
Indeed, a college education in this country is widely considered the only effective insurance against 
an otherwise highly volatile and uncertain labor market.”(Estevez-Abe et al. 2001, p. ) 
A related topic concerns the industrial fields of specialization, clearly distinct between one country 
and another. Germany mainly specializes in sectors characterized by incremental innovation, as data 
from the European Patent Office suggest (Hall and Soskice, 2001a), whereas the USA shows the 
prevalence of sectors of radical innovation. But the introduction of the sectoral dimension and 
innovation patterns has direct implications for labor protection requirements, as shown by Bassanini   19
and Ernst (2002). As is known, two different regimes of innovation may be distinguished. In the first, 
called Schumpeter Mark I (characterizing sectors such as precision instruments, standardized 
software and household appliances), innovation is radical, investment projects are short-lived, capital 
depreciation is rapid, and knowledge and competences are general. In this type of regime, featuring 
creative destruction, firms rely on the external labor market, requiring low hiring and firing costs and 
fast worker turnover. As Ernst and Bassanini (2002, p. 15) clarify, “in these industries, newly hired 
personnel brings in new ideas and allows substituting for older organizational routines, while the use 
of a standardized knowledge base allows newly hired staff to quickly learn specific applications” .  
The opposite is true for the other, routinized regime (electronic components, aircraft and spacecraft), 
also known as Schumpeter Mark II, in which technological change is by creative accumulation. In 
this case, investments are long-term oriented and human capital and skills are firm-specific. Firms 
rely on the internal labor market, since “the best available competences for this type of innovations 
can be often found inside the firm itself” (p.15). 
These considerations have immediate implications for market regulation. By considering the 
logarithm of patent per capita and the indicator of stringency of product regulation and employment 
protection, Bassanini and Ernst (2002) obtain an unequivocal sign for the first indicator for 26 OECD 
countries, suggesting that enhancing competition in the product market contributes to improving the 
innovation performance of a country. However, the effects for employment protection are 
ambiguous. By distinguishing countries by regimes of coordination, the above authors find negative 
and significant correlations only in countries with low or intermediate levels of co-ordination of the 
wage bargain; conversely, in other economies, characterized by high coordination, no significant 
relationships are obtained.  
Table 5: Innovation and regulation: Patents per million inhabitants and product/market 
regulation 
 




    Countries with high levels 
of coordination 
Countries with low and 

















Source: Bassanini and Ernst (2002).   20
These results may reflect differing sectoral specialization. As observed by Bassanini and Ernst (2002, 
pp. 15-16), countries with uncoordinated industrial relations have a comparative technological 
advantage in industries characterized by an entrepreneurial technological regime, in turn associated 
with a flexible labor market; countries characterized by industries with a population of large and 
well-established firms make more use of the firm’s internal labor market and need high and stringent 
employment protection. 
To sum up, the importance of institutional complementarities is confirmed by a whole set of 
information. In Germany, many labor institutions which secure “long employment tenures, industry-
based wages, and protective works councils” are feasible, because firms have access to finance, 
independently of downward fluctuations in profitability; they are also well integrated in a corporate 
governance system characterized by limited recourse to poaching of skilled workers, inter-firm 
collaboration, technology transfer, and cross-shareholdings.(Hall and Soskice, 2001a, p. 27).  
Table 6 offers some comparative features which support the thesis of institutional complementarities.  
 
Table 6: Complementarities in corporate governance institutions 
Coordinated Market Economies (CME) and Liberal Market Economies (LME) 
 CME  LME 
Industrial relations 
Bargaining level (a) 















      
Ownership concentration ( c ) 
Cross-shareholdings  (d) 
Employee participation in 















      
CEO Compensation (f)  47.1  44.2  100  54.4 
CEO earnings to manual worker 
earnings (f) 
10.2 7.8  25.8  15.5 
Earning dispersion (g)   2.87  2.99  3.45  4.59 
Sources: (a) OECD (2004);(b) OECD 1997; (c) average percentage of common stocks owned by five 
top largest shareholders, Prowse (1995); (d) Prowse (1995); (e) Employees appoint some board 
members, OECD (2003, pp. 47-50);OECD (2003), (f) Towers Perrin (2005), US=100, 2003; (g) 
manufacturing; 90-10 percentile ratios for gross earnings of full-time employees, Towers Perrin 
(2005). 
 
In terms of outcomes, both group of economies, CMEs and LMEs, are capable of assuring similar 
results, at least when distributional aspects are excluded from the comparison, as confirmed by the   21
econometric estimates of Hall and Gingerich (2004). This implies a confutation of the LLSV thesis: 
if one restricts analysis to developed countries, as Hall and Soskice do, Coordinated Market 
Economies, which are also civil law countries, do not deliver inferior results to Liberal Market 
Economies, as national indicators confirm, although high differentials are recorded within each group 
- as seen, for instance, in the unemployment rates of US and Ireland (see Table 7). In any case, Hall 
and Soskice do not argue that one group is superior to another, but that the two types of economies 
are characterized by different production regimes and different ‘capacities for innovation’. 
 
Table 7: Coordinated Market Economies (CME) and Liberal Market Economies-(LME)-
Economic performances 
 
  Growth rate of GDP GDP per capita
 
Unemployment rate
  74-84  85-98 74-84 85-98 74-84  85-98 
Austria 2.3  2.5 7852 17414 2.2  5.3 
Belgium 2.0  2.2 8007 17576 8.2  11.3 
Denmark 1.8  2.2  8354  18618  7.1  9.3 
Finland 2.7  2.2 7219 15619 4.8  9.4 
Iceland 4.1  2.7 8319 18285 0.6  2.5 
Germany 1.8  2.2 7542 16933 4.6  8.5 
Japan 3.3 2.6 7437 18475 2.1 2.8 
Netherlands 1.9  2.8 7872 16579 5.6  6.8 
Norway 4.0  2.9 8181 19325 2.1  4.3 
Sweden 1.8  1.5 8450 16710 2.3  4.8 
Switzerland 0.58  1.3 10680 21398 0.4  2.5 
           
CME 2.4 2.3 8174 17902 3.6 6.1 
Australia 2.8  3.3 7932 16701 6.2  8.5 
Canada 3.0  2.3 9160 18835 8.4  9.5 
Ireland 3.9 6.5 4751 12830 9.1 14.1 
New Zeland  1.8  1.7 7378 14172 2.2  6.9 
UK 1.3  2.4 7359 15942 6.7  8.7 
US 2.2  2.9  11055  22862  7.5  6.0 
LME 2.5 3.2 7939 16890 6.7 8.9 
Source: Hall and Soskice (2001a, Table 1.1, p.20). 
   
It is not by chance that Botero et al. (2004) are careful to not use differences in GDP growth as 





                                                 
11This point was clearly made by Ahlering and Deakin (2007, p. 889).   22
5. New developments and recent evidence  
Various additional critical points have been raised in the last few years. Some interesting issues, 
focused on labor regulation, are briefly reviewed below.  
 
Historical patterns of worker protection  
A critical look at the LLSV literature is given by Ahlering and Deakin (2007) and Armour and 
Deakin (2009). The ‘legal family’ hypothesis was already rebutted by analysis of historical patterns 
by Rajan and Zingales (2003) in their description of the evolution of financial development over the 
last hundred years. The authors found historical changes and “great reversals”, to paraphrase the title 
of their study. In contrast to the findings of LLSV, the authors showed that “countries with Common 
Law systems were not more financially developed in 1913… In 1913, France’s stock market 
capitalization (as a fraction of GDP) was almost twice that of the United States (0.78 vs. 0.39) even 
though the French Civil Code has never been friendly to investors…” (Rajan and Zingales, 2003, 
p.7). 
There is some indication that worker regulation differences have also occurred in the last few 
decades. This is what Armour and Deakin (2009) document in a recent research, with the main 
intention of examining the patterns of evolution of various legal systems in terms of production of 
changes in substantive rules. But the discovery of these dynamic effects calls for the construction of 
time series data, whereas previous researches focused on static cross-country comparisons
12. 
Armour and Deakin (2009) examine a group of five countries and consider the parallel evolution of 
investor and labor protection over a 35-year period. They compute a longitudinal labor regulation 
index, which  consists of 40 single variables and covers five aspects of regulation: i) labor contracts; 
ii) working time; iii) dismissal; iv) employee representation; v) industrial action
13.  
What they find is that the “crystallization” of a particular legal structure is not the main driver of 
‘substantive differences’ among countries, where by substantive differences they mean that the norm 
is not functionally equivalent to other similar norms (Deakin, Lele and Siems,  2009). 
Their other main result is that the close parallelism between weak shareholder protection and strong 
labor protection, maintained by the law-finance-labor literature, does not hold. As the authors note: 
“the pattern of change differs depending on the area of law under examination, with creditor rights 
and labor rights demonstrating much more divergence and heterogeneity than shareholder rights. We 
interpret this as casting doubt on the plausibility of the mechanisms that have been said to underpin 
                                                 
12For a description of the methodology used by the authors, see Section 4 in Armour and Deakin 
(2009). 
13 For a detailed description, see Deakin, Lele and Siems (2009, sections  4.2 and 4.3).    23
the links posited between legal origins and financial development ” (Armour and Deakin, 2009, p. 2). 
They also show the importance not of two legal families, but of three ‘parent’ systems: i) the UK, 
France and Germany; ii) the world’s most developed economy, the US; iii) the largest democracy, 
India. According to the data they collect, here shown in Figure 7, the authors suggest a divide within 
legal families, between France and Germany (civil law countries), on one hand, and the US, the UK 
and India (common law economies), on the other.  
 
Figure 7: Worker protection in five economies 
 
Source: our elaboration of  data from http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP352.pdf 
 
In addition, cross-country comparison of shareholder, creditor and worker protection reveals that 
legal rules do evolve but at different paces, and that political changes are good predictors of the most 
significant changes. For worker regulation, three of the systems - Germany, the US and India - have 
recorded fewer transformations, whereas the UK and France have undergone more pronounced 
changes, but in opposite directions. The evolution of aggregate worker protection for the UK and 









Figure 8: Worker protection in the UK and France  
 
Source: our elaboration of database used by Armour and Deakin (2009), see 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP352.pdf 
 
Disaggregated analysis for France also shows that the most important changes have been those 
related to employment contract regulations, which include provisions for temporary and part-time 
contracts, but we will consider this issue in the last section below.  
Figure 9: Worker protection in France by components 
 
Source: our elaboration of  database used by Armour and Deakin (2009), see 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP352.pdf 
 
A plausible interpretation offered by Armour and Deakin is that the UK, after the election of a 
conservative government, “underwent a rapid decline in the intensity of regulation during the 1980s 
and early 1990s, with a small revival from the late 1990s.” (Armour and Deakin, 2009, p. 30). In   25
France, instead, the election of a socialist government in 1981 led to a series of ‘worker-oriented’ 
labor reforms. 
In any case, the dynamic evolution of labor norms calls attention to the driving forces behind them. 
The role of complementarities between legal and economic institutions, left unexplored by the LLSV 
literature, seems a promising field of research. But even this perspective presents some limitations: 
“The varieties of capitalism literature, notwithstanding its emphasis on diversity  and the institutional 
richness of its accounts, suffer from some of the same limitations as the legal origin hypothesis” 
(Ahlering and Deakin, 2007, p. 903). 
The ‘efficient’ hypothesis may also be confuted by arguing that institutional complementarities 
reinforce each other and cause collusive alliances which destroy shareholder value (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2001). This line of reasoning has recently been proposed by the ’insiderness’ hypothesis, 
reviewed below. 
 
Insider capital, insider labor 
‘Insiderness’ is the central aspect which determines outcomes in corporate governance. The idea is 
that equity orientation opens markets to business competition which damages incumbent positions. 
Insider labor, i.e.workers with protected jobs, and insider finance, owners with significant control of 
corporate assets, share a common interest in preventing competition by new entrants, thus preserving 
their rents. The financial data collected by Barker and Rueda are gathered for a sample of 18 OECD 
countries between 1976 and 2004.  
Table 8 presents a selection for 2004 of a sub-sample of countries, which includes those categorized 
as coordinated economies and liberal market economies in the work of Hall and Soskice (2001). 
 
TABLE 8: Financial indicators by country, 2004 
 CME  LME 
 Germany  Japan  US  UK 
International equity 
issuance/GDP (%) 
0.6189 0.1709  0.0128  0.9949 
Equity market 
capitalization/GDP (%) 
44.006 76.949  86.366 131.530 
Value of equity traded/GDP (%)  56.80  69.646  82.140  241.776 
Shareholder protection index (a) 
(6= highest, 0=lowest) 
3 5  5  5 
Source: Barker and Rueda (2007, Table 1); (a) 2002 and 2003. 
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In addition, Barker and Rueda (2007) test their hypothesis by econometric estimates over the period 
1976-2004. Their results suggest that measures of power of incumbent labor (wage growth, lower 
increase in hours worked) as well as of incumbent capital (low international trade openness and 
measures to discourage the entry of other competitors) are the main drivers of limited orientation 
towards ‘outsider’ finance. Hence, international equity issuance, equity market capitalization, value 
of equity traded and minority shareholder protection are found to be negatively associated with 
‘insiderness’.  
The emphasis on product market competition and on interests of insider labor (as stakeholders) is 
also central in another recent study (Allen, Carletti and Marquez, 2009), focusing on the firm 
objective function and its orientation toward stakeholder governance. The authors propose a 
theoretical model which formalizes corporate strategies into two different scenarios dominated, 
respectively, by cost or demand uncertainty. In the first, concern for stakeholders induces firms to 
charge higher prices in order to face cost pressures, thus benefiting stakeholders and softening 
competition. In this case, the authors demonstrate that shareholder and stakeholder interests end by 
being aligned. Conversely, when demand uncertainty affects future profitability, concern for 
stakeholders leads to lower prices relative to the case of shareholder companies, increasing 
competition.
14 In sum, demand uncertainty leads to a reversal of the insider labor anti-competitive 




Insider labor may also also a crucial role in the internal operation of a firm, as argued by Acharya, 
Myers and Rajan (2009). The authors start their analysis by critically evaluating the system of checks 
and balances that monitor the decisions of corporate managers. They observe that CEOs are often 
self-interested (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997); the market for corporate control plays an insufficient 
role, as disciplinary devices and shareholders exert poor control over institutional mechanisms like 
boards (Monks, 2008).  
However, they argue “that there are important stakeholders in the firm, such as critical employees, 
who care about its future even if the CEO has short horizons and is self-interested and shareholders 
                                                 
14The authors consider a duopoly two-period model, in which decisions adopted in the first period 
influence the survival of the firm and hence the second period results. They show that, in the case of 
cost uncertainty, the survival probability increases by the fact that higher prices are charged (to offset 
higher costs); in this case, the shareholder and stakeholder approaches are equivalent. This is not true 
in the case of demand uncertainty, when competition is intensified and incentives firms to reduce 
their prices; however, these incentives are lower in stakeholder firms.   27
are dispersed and powerless. These stakeholders, because of their power to withdraw their 
contributions to the firm, can force a self-interested myopic CEO to act in a more public-spirited and 
far-sighted way (Acharya, Myers and Rajan, 2009, p. 1). This process can be called ‘internal 
governance’.  
Three points qualify this new mechanism of governance. First, there is a bottom-up influence 
exercised by those employees who have no formal control, but who may affect the firm’s rents. 
Second, there are also non-financial investors, such as employees, who make firm-specific 
investments, as already shown by Blair (1999). Third, the presence of different parties as different 
claimers and with different time-horizons introduces the need “to pay attention to others’ residual 
claims in order to elicit co-operation “(Acharya, Myers and Rajan, 2009, p. 1).  
Internal governance has a natural premise in the new concept of firms advanced by others, including 
Rajan and Zingales (1998, 2000), in which  the availability of financing has given investments in 
intangible assets such as human capital more importance. In the new firm, which qualifies as a nexus 
of explicit and implicit-relational contracts,  i.e., informal agreements sustained by the value of 
future relationships (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002), top executives develop closer contacts with 
lower-level but talented employees; middle managers are eliminated, and “the firm bifurcates into top 
management who are owners/partners …and worker/managers who cannot be trusted till they have 
served time in the firm” (Rajan and Wulf, 2003, p. 32).  
In terms of internal organization, a trend towards delayering seems to emerge. Two specific 
dimensions of the firm’s hierarchy must be considered: breadth (number of positions reporting to the 
CEO) and depth (number of positions between the CEO and the divisional manager). An examination 
of both dimensions, like that performed by Rajan and Wulf (2003) for the 1990s in over 300 large 
U.S. industrial firms, reveals organizational changes toward a new flattening firm
15. For instance, in 
terms of breadth, “the number of managers reporting to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has 
increased steadily over time, from an average (median) of 4.4 (4) in 1986 to 7.2 (7) in 1999”. In 
terms of depth, “the number of positions between the CEO and the lowest managers with profit 
responsibility (division heads), has decreased steadily by more than 25% over the period” (Rajan and 




                                                 
15Rajan and Wulf use “a detailed database of job descriptions of top managers, reporting 
relationships, and compensation structures in over 300 large U.S. firms tracked over a period of up to 
14 years” (Rajan and Wulf (2003, p. 1).   28
Figure 10: The Flattening Firm- Organizational Span in a sample of 300 large US companies 
 
Source: Rajan and Wulf (2003, Tab.2, p.41; Tab. 4, p. 43) 
In the new firm, incentives must promote specialization of human capital but also avert competition 
from talented and key employees who can exit from the firm. For instance, Rajan and Zingales (2000, 
p. 28) offer some examples which show the importance of human capital and encourage the search 
for new foundations for corporate finance, such as that of the advertising agency Saatchi and Saatchi: 
“In 1994,   .S. fund managers, who controlled 30 per cent of the shares, opposed the award of a 
generous option package to Maurice Saatchi, the charismatic chairman of Saatchi and 
Saatchi…The opposition of the fund managers lea to the departure of Maurice Saatchi, and was 
quickly followed by the resignation of several key senior executives. These executives, together 
with the Saatchi brothers, started a rival agency (M&C Saatchi), that in a short period of time 
captured some of the most important accounts of the original Saatchi & Saatchi, including British 
Airways, Mars, Dixons, and Gallagher. Interestingly, one of the executives who left, wrote in his 




The process of empowerment thus needs a higher proportion of the value of incentive - long-term pay 
to the value of salary and bonus, as shown in Figure 11, which demonstrates that, as the number of 
the positions reporting to the CEO increases, the importance of long-term rewards also increases. 
 




































Source: Rajan and Wulf (2003, Tab 7, p. 46). Long-term incentives are defined as the 
ratio of the value of incentive pay to the sum of salary and bonus. 
 
In sum, the modern corporation profile, which emerges from the American scenario depicted in the 
studies mentioned above, shows an intrinsic need for lengthening  its governance devices: short-run 
fixed rewards are partially substituted by long-run incentive payments; top executives develop closer 
contacts with ‘critical’ employees, as signaled by recent trends in breadth and depth changes in the 
firm.  
 
Recent evidence and recent divides in European economies 
 
The last section concerns the most important changes in labor regulation (and deregulation) which 
have characterized the European economies and influenced their performance in terms of innovation 
and productivity. 
One main channel which secures flexibility is numerical flexibility, represented by the use of 
temporary and part-time contracts. It is known that  the most important rules for the protection of 
labor contracts are measured by the OECD Employment Protection Legislation index (EPL), which 
covers two different areas: regular jobs or temporary works. In the first area, job protection is 
represented by firing restrictions. In this case, negative effects are expected, since opportunistic   30
behavior is encouraged under lower threat of dismissal (Boeri and Jimeno, 2005). In the second area, 
we find deregulation of employment contracts, which allows firms to use fixed-term contracts or 
temporary work agencies. Usually, in the case of rigid regulations for permanent employees, fixed-
term contracts play the role of ‘buffer stock’; their importance is thus conditioned by several crucial 
factors such as the role of firing and hiring costs, elasticity of substitution between permanent and 
temporary workers, and relative wages of permanent and fixed-term employees.  
Other arguments show that there is a trade-off: employment protection raises the costs at separation, 
but also encourages specific investments and efficiency. In this vein, Belot, Boone and van Ours 
(2007), using a theoretical model and empirical estimates for 17 OECD countries, highlight the 
existence of an inverse U-shaped relationship between employment protection and economic growth. 
They show that the exact optimal level of employment protection depends on other labor market 
features, such as the bargaining power of workers and other wage rigidities (e.g., minimum wages).  
They found that, when effort and investments in human capital are non-contractible, employment 
protection solves hold-up problems. Protection of this kind encourages employees to invest in firm-
specific human capital and this beneficial effect is stronger in those sectors in which firm 
specialization in competences is more important.  
Note that temporary contracts may have important effects. On one hand, under the assumption that 
temporary workers intend to obtain permanent positions, these arrangements may be screen devices 
to select new employees, and are thus “potential ‘stepping stones’ to generally preferable permanent 
jobs” (Engellandt and Riphahn, 2004, p. 2). On the other hand, fixed-term contracts reduce the 
training motivation for workers and firms and discourage investments in firm-specific human capital.  
The European scenario is an ideal case to test these competing hypotheses, since reforms in 
temporary contracts have characterized various countries and have been more important than changes 
in rules for regular contracts. Indeed, three main components are included in the OECD indicator for 
EPL strictness: protection of regular workers against individual dismissals, requirements for 
collective dismissals, and regulation of temporary employment (OECD, 1994, p.65). The changes 
recorded by the OECD, shown in Figure 12, show that the greatest relaxation in the strictness of rules 







Figure 12: Changes in Employment Protection 1998-2003 
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We also examine the strictness of rules on temporary work agencies and fixed-term contracts, 
computed by Brandt et al. (2007) for a subset of European economies, and by considering time-
varying cross-country data (Figure 13): 
 
Figure 13: Development of employment protection legislation of temporary contracts - 1995-
2003 
 
Source: Brandt et al. (2007). F figure shows evolution of indicator computed by authors; scale is 0-6, 
and falling values mean less restriction on temporary contracts. 
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Figure 13 shows that there has been considerable diversity in the dynamic patterns of the stringency 
of temporary contracts, and Italy has made the most significant change toward deregulation. 
Additional evidence shows that changes in formal rules have been accompanied by changes in de 
facto practices, as Italian companies have recorded drastic increases in employment flexibility (see 
Figure 14). 
These changes were recorded in a period which witnessed the re-emergence of a divide between 
Europe and the US. In the words of Trichet (2007): 
“Faster output growth and slower labour input growth have jointly contributed to increase measured 
labour productivity growth in the US. These recent developments are in stark contrast to the rest of 
the post-WWII experience. First, they represent a break in the process of European catching-up and a 
resumed widening of the productivity gap with the US. Second, the broad tendencies across the 
Atlantic are no longer aligned, so we cannot explain them with the occurrence of a worldwide 
adverse shock, such as oil in the 1970s. The roots of the European productivity slowdown must be 
found within Europe”. 
One of the hypotheses suggested by Trichet “is that the aggregate euro area picture is misleading, 
because important differences exist across countries”. Among these differences, the main divide, as 
in the EU-US comparison, is attributable to Total Factor Productivity. Indeed, in the intra-European 
context, the main disparity in labor productivity growth between individual European economies is to 
be found not in differences in the intensity of the production factors, but in the multifactor 
productivity component, the residual measure which captures not only unmeasured inputs but also 























Austria 2.19  1.74  0.6 
Belgium 2.04  1.46  -0.26 
Denmark 1.81  1.28  -0.17 
Finland 3.42  2.63  1.43 
France 2.09  1.84  0.6 
Germany 1.32  1.55  0.46 
Ireland 7.26  5.31  0.82 
Italy 1.18  0.64  -0.46 
Neth. 2.51 1.87  0.45 
Portugal 2.18  1.72  -0.8 
Spain 3.44  1.48  -0.78 
Sweden 2.87  2.67  0.91 
UK 2.72  2.15  0.31 
EU13 2.69  2.3  0.24 
Source: EU-Klems, Damiani and Pompei (2008). 
One explanation is that reforms ‘at the margin’, which enlarge recourse to fixed-term contracts, allow 
firms to exploit hiring flexibility in favorable business conditions, but not to obtain downward 
flexibility in adverse conditions; possible employment gains due to the reforms are offset by 
productivity losses due to decreasing marginal returns (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007). 
An examination of recent studies which test the role of labor protection shows fluctuating results. 
Some contributions, through econometric estimates and samples of ample coverage, have found that 
union density, unemployment benefits and product market regulation generally contribute toward 
increasing joblessness, but that high degrees of employment protection may exert opposite and 
beneficial effects, since higher job security increases effort and reduces wage bonuses; they also 
found substitutive effects of product and labor market regulation, since an increase in product market 
competition, increasing labor turnover, lowers job security (Amable et al. 2007)
16. Others separate 
the role of temporary contract legislations and document the (negative) influence of lower temporary 
                                                 
16The authors, reviewing a large  body of literature, observe that: “The evidence supporting the 
standard view that labour deregulation yields a positive impact on employment is, however, 
seemingly not conclusive" (p. 5).    34
contract regulation on productivity growth (Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2008; Damiani and Pompei, 
2009)
17. By country-sectoral comparisons, they found that shorter-term jobs and lower employment 
tenures may discourage investments in skills and have negative effects on multifactor productivity 
growth; conversely, forms of employee involvement in corporate governance, such as co-
determination, mitigate these perverse effects on efficiency patterns. Other authors have found 
negative effects only for protection of regular jobs but not for temporary ones (see Bassanini, 
Nunziata and Venn, 2009)
18. A brief array of the selected empirical contributions which test the 
























                                                 
17The study examines cross-national and sectoral differences in multifactor productivity growth in 16 
European countries from 1995 to 2005. 
18For calculation of OECD indicators for regular and temporary contracts used by authors, see OECD 
(2004, Annex 2.A1).    35
Table 10: Comparative capitalism and labor protection: some selected econometric studies 
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As mentioned above, various labor market regulations offer remedies for hold-up by employers, as 
regards provision for insurance, job-seeking and training incentives, and many studies  on macro-
economic frameworks have analyzed the impact of these policies on employment and unemployment 
rates, or on unemployment inflows and outflows, as reviewed by OECD (2007), but have reserved   36
less space to evaluation of corporate success. However, some recent contributions have addressed 
this issue, although empirical evidence calls for further examination of the conditions which support 
employment tenure, investment in skills, and organizational improvements which outperform short-




Recent research has started to remove two major limitations of the economics of labor protection: 
first, the scarce attention paid to potential complementarities between patterns of ownership and 
shareholder protection and labor regulation; second, the influence of employees within managerial 
processes, through the channel of employee representation at firm level, mainly  unexplored in the 
majority of comparative studies. 
We have examined several studies which have started to fill these gaps. The first, oriented to a 
shareholder perspective, sees access to finance as the major condition for firm success and considers 
more severe labor regulation, as well as lower shareholder protection, as serious obstacles to this 
access. The second study, more favorable to a stakeholder view, supports the importance of de facto 
labor rules which improve the climate of corporate governability and do not degenerate into 
excessive income inequalities. The third - more fragmentary - view calls attention to the importance 
of institutional complementarities by showing that systems of labor regulation exert their function in 
strategic interactions with other institutions. We should also note that these competing views, as seen 
above, have been supported by competing databases: the first is represented by legal families; the 
second by labor practices, and the third by measures which change over time and which include a 
whole array of complementary institutions.  
These studies, which have tried to overcome the limitations mentioned above by estimating the joint 
effects of various institutions on corporate governance and labor relations, are still insufficient with 
respect to examination of the productivity effects of institutional devices. 
This perspective is made necessary by  recent developments focusing  on the firm and its 
organization. Here, as emphasized by Blair (1999, p.63) “The lesson from labour has been that 
employee investments in firm-specific human capital cannot be well protected by explicit and 
complete contracts. Other institutional arrangements are needed and these institutional arrangements 
have the effect of tying the fortunes of the employee together with those of the firm.” But the 
pathways by means of which each variety of capitalism ties these fortunes together still differ among 
themselves.    37
The internal governance exerted by ‘critical employees’ (in the varieties of capitalism characterized 
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